Original Article

Mediating Violence in Jamaica Through a Gang Truce

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Abstract

The article examines a gang-related peace initiative instituted in Greater August Town, Jamaica. Our objective was to understand the negotiation processes and determine whether the gang truce resulted in the desired outcome: a reduction in homicide. Bivariate analyses showed a significant decline in homicides immediately following the truce. Upon closer examination, however, comparing change in the target area to the balance areas in Jamaica and accounting for temporal trends, we found that the decline in homicide was part of a larger nationwide decline in violence and that the gang truce was not responsible for the decline. The only significant effect was the possibility that homicides were displaced outside the target area for a brief period of time.

Keywords

gang, truce, Jamaica, violence, homicide, intervention

Given the devastating individual, family, and community effects of gang violence, over the past several decades, an increasing body of literature has focused on gangs, gang members, and gang activity. A core theme running throughout this body of literature is that gang members are significantly more likely to be the offenders and victims of violent crime than nongang members (Esbensen et al., 2001) and disproportionately affect neighborhood levels of violence (Block, 2000). These findings have been robust, in that

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10.1177/1057567720975631

they have been repeatedly found regardless of research methodology or research setting (M. Klein & Maxson, 2006). As a consequence, it should not be surprising that policymakers and academics have focused much of their attention on developing responses to gang violence.

Suppression strategies have been the favored public policy response to gangs since the 1980s (Spergel ~~et al.~~, 1995[AQ3]). Suppression strategies typically rely on focusing criminal justice resources on gang members through such practices as surveillance, targeted police patrols, vertical prosecution, and enhanced sentences for those convicted (Katz & Webb, 2006). Suppression strategies are based on deterrence theory and are founded on the principle that swift, certain, and severe penalties for gang crime will necessarily result in fewer individuals joining gangs and will deter people from engaging in gang violence (M. Klein, 1995). While in some communities, gang-based suppression strategies have evolved with the incorporation of problem-solving (i.e., problem-oriented policing and pulling levers; Braga et al., 2001), others have evolved with the incorporation of more exacting and punitive policies (i.e., "Mano Dura" and "Super Mana Dura"; Hume, 2007; Rodgers, 2009).

By the early-to-mid 1990s, as gang problems continued to proliferate, policymakers sought alternative gang control strategies such as gang prevention programming, which were aimed at the general youth population or focused on at-risk youth or neighborhoods. These programs were based on the premise that by reducing risk factors and increasing protective factors, prevention specialists could inoculate youth from gangs (Esbensen, 2000). While a burgeoning body of literature has emerged examining the assumptions, identifying the issues, and evaluating the effectiveness of suppression and prevention strategies, much less attention has been given to examining gang intervention programming. This might largely be the consequence of the absence of such programming over the past 30–40 years. Intervention programs often focused on diverting youth from gangs or sought to minimize the consequences of gangs and gang activity (i.e., harm reduction). Gang intervention strategies include crisis intervention, dispute resolution, street-level counseling, and youth outreach (Spergel, 1995).

By the 1980s, policymakers no longer believed that social intervention approaches were an effective strategy to control gangs and gang violence. Although gang intervention strategies took many forms, they were based on two assumptions: That gang membership is the by-product of a socially deprived community and that the values and norms of gang youth can be influenced and directed toward those of mainstream society (Spergel, 1995). Such approaches, it has been argued, not only did not reduce gang activity but may also have led to increased group cohesiveness, which in turn may have led to increased violence (M. Klein, 1995). More recent research has yielded similar results. For example, a number of studies examining U.S.-based replications of Chicago CeaseFire/Cure

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10.1177/1057567720975631

Violence, which relies heavily on crisis intervention, dispute resolution, street-level counseling, and youth outreach, have found these strategies to either be ineffective, or worse, increase levels of violence (A. Fox et al., 2015[AQ4]).

Regardless, as of late, social intervention programs have become increasingly popular in the Caribbean and Central America. For example, the peacemaking programing by the Jamaica Peace Management Initiative (PMI), which seeks to reduce retaliatory violence through dialogue and mediation, has been recognized by community leaders as having an impact on reducing violence in several targeted communities (Hutchinson, 2015; Violence Prevention Alliance, 2011). In Belize, the government established a conflict mediation program as part of its Restore Belize initiative. The initiative trains Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) teams in mediation and conflict resolution skills. CSO teams in turn train institutional leaders (e.g., school leaders, prison officials, community leaders) who hand select cases to mediate (Hemmer, 2015). Mediation frequently focuses on issues related to retaliatory gang violence. The program evolved into its involvement in a gang truce, which orchestrated a truce with 200 gang members from 13 gangs (E. Fox, 2012). While these programs have not been rigorously evaluated, some have. Maguire et al. (2018) evaluated the Cure Violence program in Trinidad and Tobago and found that it resulted in a substantial reduction in violence as measured through police calls for service, official crime reports, and emergency room admissions. Likewise, Guerra Williams et al. (2010) evaluated a YMCA-based peacemaking program in Jamaica. They reported that at-risk low-income males who received intensive skills programming reduced their aggressive behavior when compared to a control group.

Over the last few years, truces have also increasingly become a popular gang violence intervention strategy. For example, gang truces have been reported in Belize, Brazil, Colombia, El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico, Trinidad and Tobago (Muggah et al., 2013), Jamaica (Katz & Amaya, 2015), and the United States in such cities as Raleigh, North Carolina (McDonald, 2016), and Los Angeles (Cruz & Chang, 2019). However, within the social intervention framework, the gang truce has received little attention in the literature. This is somewhat surprising given its use and public claims of effectiveness (e.g., Brotherton, 2013). Gang truces have largely been a "black box"; that is, little is known about the conditions that give rise to them, the role of third parties in brokering gang truces, the transformative effects of truces, and the effectiveness of gang truces. The purpose of this article is to systematically examine the effectiveness of a gang truce. Here, we review prior research on gang truces and present evidence on the processes and outcome of a gang truce that was implemented in Jamaica.

Theoretical and Policy Rationales for Gang Truces

Much of the concern about gangs over the past 20 years has been their close association with violence. Decker and Winkle (1996)[AQ5] attributes the gang–violence

relationship, in part, to the collective and normative structure of gangs, which supports and encourages the use of violence, both preemptively and in retaliation. He further explains that gang membership encourages the use of violence in retaliation against threats and attacks, whether actual or perceived, which results in patterns of intergang conflict characterized by escalating violence. Cooney (1998) makes the related point that gangs are not all that different from "warrior societies." He argues that while gangs are violent, the violence that they engage in is different than that engaged in by nongang members, in that it commonly takes on a feud-like dimension. A perceived slight, violation of turf or other disrespectful action might invoke a shooting, which, in turn, evokes a retaliatory shooting, which, in turn, results in another retaliatory shooting—creating a self-perpetuating cycle of violence.

Early research and theoretical work examining gangs and gang conflict suggested that much violent gang behavior was the function of status management (Short & Strodtbeck, 1965). Borrowing from the sociology and social psychology literature on impression management theory, gang scholars hypothesized that youth place significant emphasis on image management and, in so doing, seek to impress their peers and limit the potential to embarrass themselves in front of others (Hughes, 2005). These early gang theorists contend that gang members often make decisions to become involved in a violent conflict based on rational processes that weight the immediate loss or gain of status within the gang, against the relatively small probability of being formally sanctioned by officials within the criminal justice system (Hughes, 2005). A number of researchers have examined the relationship between status considerations and gang violence and have found the association to be particularly robust regardless of gender, ethnicity, and location (Spergel, 1995). Hughes (2005) notes that the centrality of status consciousness by gang youth may account for their greater involvement in crime and delinquency, as gang scholars have repeatedly observed (Thornberry et al., 2003). Another micro-social factor associated with gang violence is group cohesiveness. While our understanding of the relationship between gang cohesiveness and violence is limited, some scholars have reported a strong relationship between the two. In particular, M. Klein (1971), M. Klein and Crawford (1967), and Lucore (1975) have reported that increases in gang cohesiveness lengthen periods of gang membership and increases members' participation in gang crime and violence. Cooney (1998) points out that there are strong relational ties between gang members that necessarily result in increased cohesiveness among members. For example, gangs are composed of neighborhood youth who share common cultural and economic experiences. He also points out that gangs are groups that have strong self-proclaimed and formalized identities and have at least some organizational structure. Their sense of group is maintained by their common understanding of their members and friends and their attachment to their territory. Decker (1996) notes that the

relatively high level of group cohesiveness exhibited by gangs facilitates both collective behavior and liability (for exception, see Hughes, 2013).

Accordingly, both micro-social factors (i.e., status management, group cohesion) serve to augment levels of gang violence and make it difficult for third parties to intervene. Violence within the context of gangs serves as a form of informal social control. Gangs and gang members cannot seek assistance from legitimate institutions of social control to solve conflicts because they would risk losing status (Anderson, 1999). Likewise, the collective nature of the gang not only increases potential offenders and targets of violence (Decker, 1996) but also facilitates, at the group level, the need for retributive justice on the behalf of injured members. Moreover, gang members desire to impress others with their commitment to the group and use violence to demonstrate their commitment to their group and to increase their status within the group. All of this results in an increased cycle of gang conflict and violence.

Policymakers and the public have expected the police to control violent gang conflicts. However, as noted by Katz and Webb (2006), there are several limitations to the police response to gangs. First, as noted above, many of the same factors that are associated with violent gang conflict also limit the effectiveness of the police to have an impact on violent gang conflict. Second, citizens in neighborhoods with gang problems are also reluctant to call the police out of fear of gang reprisals or because they have a negative perception of the police. Third, the police response to gangs in most communities is often reactive to a specific incident, rather than a proactive problem-solving intervention in ongoing disputes between gangs. Most police agencies simply do not have the intelligence networks required to intervene in gang conflicts until after they have risen to relatively high levels. Fourth, police suppression strategies have been linked to increasing gang cohesiveness and possible increases in gang crime (Katz & Webb, 2006).

Some policymakers and community activists have proffered that an alternative to reliance on formal mechanisms of social control, such as the police, is the gang truce (Spergel, 1995). The goal of a gang truce is to reduce or even eliminate violent conflict between those gangs that are warring with one another. As such, compared with other strategies that often seek to reduce general levels of crime, a gang truce has the very specific goal of reducing violence between two or more gangs that are in conflict with one another. Unfortunately, the literature provides little guidance on the theoretical assumptions of why a gang truce should reduce intergang violence. Henderson and Leng (1999) hypothesized that at the root of gang truces is the notion that they involve the renegotiation of existing norms within and between gangs. The authors claim that as a violent dispute escalates between gangs, leaders and members are placed in the situation of appearing weak to both members of their own gang and to members of the rival gang, if they do not respond with the appropriate amount of force or if they were to suggest a

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10.1177/1057567720975631

peaceful resolution to the dispute. Accordingly, Henderson and Leng (1999) argued that as the cycle of violence escalates between two or more gangs, behavioral norms shift toward the increased valuation of violence to resolve the conflict because it is the only option readily available to them. A gang truce, on the other hand, which is often mediated by a third party, is believed to break the cycle of violence by providing the gangs involved in the dispute with a period of de-escalation with which to reassess their conduct (Spergel, 1995). In this period, new norms of expected behavior within and between gangs may be established. In other words, a truce is believed to recalibrate norms of behavior that are more consistent with the security interests of the gang and its members (Henderson & Leng, 1999).

Gang truces have been observed in the United States, Central America, and the Caribbean (Fahah, 2012).[AQ6] Unfortunately, little is known about gang truces. We know little about when they come into consideration, how they are implemented, and whether they decrease, increase, or even have an impact on violence. In the following section, we review the existing body of literature on gang truces.

Prior Research on Gang Truces

The first attempt to evaluate a gang truce, to our knowledge, was conducted by Cotton (1992) who examined the results of a gang truce in South Central Los Angeles between the Crips and the Bloods. Data provided by the police department indicated that over the 6-week period when the truce took place, drive-by shootings decreased by 48%, that is, from 162 to 85 when compared to the similar 6-week period in the prior year. Likewise, gang-related homicides dropped by 62%, from 26 to 10. Ordog et al. (1993, 1995) examined the effects of the same gang truce in Los Angeles using emergency room admissions data. Specifically, the authors examined changes in the daily and monthly number of gunshot wound (GSW) emergency room admissions before, during, and after a gang truce. Student's *t* tests were used to examine changes before, during, and after the gang truce. Ordog et al. (1995) reported that there were approximately seven GSW admissions per day in the 12 months preceding the truce, compared to 4½ GSW admissions per day during the gang truce, and 12.6 GSW admissions per day in the 11 months following the gang truce. The authors concluded that their analysis "clearly showed that the institution of a gang truce had reduced the number of GSW victims seen in an…inner city Level I trauma center" (Ordog et al., 1995, p. 419). However, it is important to point out that while the gang truce in Los Angeles did decrease homicides by about 35% for the first 3 months, it then doubled in Months 4 through 11, compared with the pre-truce period (Ordog et al., 1995).

Similar, findings were reported in Trinidad and Tobago. In Trinidad and Tobago, conflict ensued over a government infrastructure project, the Unemployment Relief Program (URP), where fraudulent workers were employed by community/gang leaders,

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10.1177/1057567720975631

who sought to control turf due to its implications for receiving URP contracts from the government. In 2006, in response to rising violence, the Minister of National Security hosted a meeting with gang leaders in an attempt to dissuade them from engaging in retaliatory violence. At the meeting, a gang truce between gang leaders in the Port of Spain area was signed and announced to the public. While the truce was popular among certain elements of the community, 2 years later, most of the gang leaders had been murdered as a result of gang violence. Maguire et al. (2013), in an unpublished evaluation, examined the impact of the Trinidad gang truce using official police data. They reported that homicides declined for a brief period (again, for about 3 months) but then increased over the long term (12 months). These results suggest that gang truces may produce short-term benefits, yet result in long-term adverse consequences.

Recent research in El Salvador suggests however that the gang truce might produce greater change than originally thought. Prior to the 2012 Salvadorian gang truce, the nation was faced with unparalleled levels of violence. International governments and development agencies invested hundreds of millions of dollars into violence reduction programs to address the problem. Nothing seemed to work. In response to the inadequacy of traditional strategies, stakeholders altered their course in an effort to radically reduce gang violence in the nation. Members of the Funes administration led a group of negotiators comprised of the Catholic Church, a former congressman, and the Organization of the American States to help frame the conditions for a possible truce between the MS13 and 18th Street gangs (Umaña et al., 2014). In March 2012, a truce was reached, and homicides declined precipitously. The truce was credited for the decline, and other nations considered replicating it (Negroponte, 2013).

Katz et al. (2016) examined the impact of a Salvadorian gang truce in 262 municipalities 26 months prior to and 28 months following the truce. After controlling for municipal-level socioeconomic variables, the truce was associated with a significant reduction in homicides. The authors estimate that about 5,500 homicides were prevented. Additionally, they reported that 12 months following the truce homicides began to increase, 28 months post-truce homicides had approached pre-truce levels, and 36 months post-truce homicides had increased to record highs. Recently, regional experts have suggested that the long-term consequences of the truce were that gangs enhanced their territorial control over communities and their influence over political processes (Avalos, 2019).

While the research examining gang truces shows their promise, and their potential for harm, we believe that the findings should be viewed with caution for three reasons. First, some prior research of gang truces has relied on relatively weak methodological designs. Some studies, for instance, have not incorporated the use of comparison areas or control groups. The causes of reductions in gang violence found in previous evaluations might be

many. For example, the Los Angeles riots took place just before the gang truce that Ordog et al. evaluated. Zinzun (1997) reported that gang culture and violence changed briefly but abruptly following the riots because gangs and gang members, in part, redirected their anger and focus toward the police. As such, the decline in GSW admissions may have been the consequence of an overall citywide decline in gang violence in the wake of the riots. Some research designs used in previous studies lacked specificity in terms of the "treatment area." For example, Ordog et al.'s (1993, 1995) outcome measures included all emergency room admissions for GSW. However, the emergency room received patients from a 100-mile square area surrounding the hospital, an area that was most likely much larger than the gangs' territories involved in the truce.

Moreover, prior research examining gang truces has not thoroughly examined the processes involved in the creation of the gang truce. Little context has been provided in terms of the factors that lead to the gang truces, whether the gangs were pushed or pulled into truces, whether outside parties helped to mediate the truces, or whether ongoing mediation was required to maintain the truce. We still do not know the processes related to the formation of a gang truce. Prior research has treated the gang truce much like a black box, where it is described in very general terms, but its details are not revealed.

This Study

This study seeks to improve on prior research by examining the peace initiative instituted by the PMI in Greater August Town, Jamaica. Our objective was to understand the negotiation processes undertaken with and between gangs and other stakeholders and to identify the actors involved in the negotiations, the goal(s) of the negotiations, and the strategies employed to carry them out. We also seek to determine whether the gang truce resulted in the desired outcome: a reduction in the number of homicides in the Greater August Town area. In the sections that follow, we describe the conditions that led to the truce and those that prevailed during the truce. This discussion is then followed by a description of our methods used to determine whether the truce had the intended impact.

Setting

Jamaica is ranked as one of the 10 most violent nations in the world, with a homicide rate of 44.3 per 100,000 residents (Planning Institute of Jamaica, 2015). Researchers have attributed the nation's high level of violence to different sets of factors, some proximate such as drug trafficking and dealing in other illegal goods and services (A. Klein et al., 2004) and access to illegal firearms (Lemard & Hemenway, 2006[AQ7]), some distal and structural including high levels of inequality and chronic youth unemployment (Francis et al., 2009), some social process outcomes such as the emergence of a subculture of violence (Harriott, 2008a[AQ8]), and historical processes that include a legacy of conflict between the nation's two primary political parties (Sives, 2010), all of which have

facilitated the entrenchment of the more powerful gangs in communities of the urban poor.

Jamaica's homicide problem is closely associated with its gang problem. The Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) has estimated that in 2014, some 272 gangs were active in the nation. Gang types and their respective historical patterns of conflict matter in Jamaica, as these variations may determine their predisposition or amenability to lasting, rather than opportunistic, truces. Jamaican gangs include organized crime groups, conflict gangs, defense crews who regard themselves as defenders of their communities (Levy, 2009), and other less cohesive, more transient territorial groups.

Estimates of the gang-related homicide rate in Jamaica vary, perhaps because the crime is not clearly defined. Regardless, researchers agree that the proportion of homicides that are gang-related has increased substantially. For example, Harriott (2003), whose work was based on original crime report documents provided by the JCF, reported a fourfold increase in the rate of group-related homicides between 1983 and 1997. Likewise, Hill (2013), using official police data, reported an eightfold increase from 2001 to 2009. To address the problem, Jamaica has initiated traditional law enforcement strategies such as initiating curfews (Sinclair & Tuner, 2005), giving the police increased powers as is provided for during states of emergency (Jamaican Observer, 2010), and making structural changes such as establishing a specialized gang unit (Sinclair, 2005)[AQ9]. It also attempted legislative reforms to curb election fraud and electoral-related violence that involved local gangs (Levy, 2009) and imposed anti-gang legislation. None of these approaches stemmed the tide of gang violence. In 2002, the Minister of National Security established the PMI (Henry, 2011) to augment governmental and nongovernmental organizational capacity to settle gang disputes in the community through intervention-based programming such as ceasefires and gang truces.

The Greater August Town Peace Initiative, which was a product of the PMI, was long lived when compared to other truces in Jamaica. As a part of a swing electoral district or constituency, it was a site of serious political violence from 1980 to 1993, and it remains a swing or politically competitive district today. It is a nongarrison community of the urban poor. Garrisons are by definition atypical in their everyday affairs beyond the reach of law enforcement and are more under political influence and control. August Town is thus much like other Jamaican communities that have experienced gang truces. We should note that it is perhaps atypical in terms of its connection to mainstream institutions and in the types and degree of support that the truce received (see Discussion section). The PMI was, however, able to secure some state resources into some of the other truce areas (Hutchinson, 2015). The main source of support for social crime prevention programs is the Citizens Security and Justice Program of the Government of Jamaica, which targets these hotspot neighborhoods.

The Greater August Town (Jamaica) Peace Initiative

Greater August Town is located on the northeastern outskirts of the city of Kingston. This low-income area has high rates of youth unemployment and a history of gang-related violence (Charles, 2004; Levy, 2009). Over the last decade, the Greater August Town area has sought improved living conditions and revitalization (Levy, 2009, p. 95). The area's inherent resilience has been augmented by nearby intellectual and cultural engines such as the University of the West Indies (UWI) and the University of Technology (Charles, 2004, p. 38). The UWI, for example, runs a Township Project, which invests in improving the social and occupational skills of young people who reside in that community and in various ways enrich its cultural life and access to opportunity.

Greater August Town is comprised of the communities of August Town proper, which is fractured into several locales such as Hermitage, Goldsmith Villa, and Bedward Gardens. These socially defined community divisions and subdivisions, that is, boundaries that are named by the people who live there and are used to indicate belonging and solidarities, in-groups, and out-groups are also markers for the territorial boundaries of street gangs and, therefore, in some instances, are lines of potential conflict. Some of those boundaries demarcate areas of Greater August Town that are predominantly supportive of one or another political party, but the boundaries do not always hold political significance. Politics is but one element in the conflict geography of the area. Like many communities of the urban poor, the Greater August Town area is easily mobilized politically. **[AQ10]**This reality is understood and at times exploited by street gangs who politicize gang "wars" in their efforts to build alliances within the communities, to secure the protection of their favored political party, and to thereby neutralize the police. In fact, the basic principle of community mobilization in Jamaica is political patronage and clientelism. In these communities of the urban poor, access to resources such as jobs and housing is often determined by the dominant political party. As a consequence, some political supporters, including gang members, invest heavily in the electoral contests and provoke conflicts that affirm their loyalty to their party in order to secure material benefits from it. Political competition is therefore one conflict fault line. Specifically, political support in Greater August Town is divided between the Peoples' National Party (PNP) and the Jamaica Labor Party (JLP). Some gangs are aligned with the PNP and others with the JLP; this often resulted in political boundaries overlapping with gang turf (Charles, 2004).

Pre-truce violence

Gang violence in the Greater August Town area first appeared as political violence that was closely associated with the electoral cycle. As in many other urban communities, the problem intensified deeply affecting community life in the period just prior to the national elections of 1980—then continued cyclically until 1993. Gangs have since tapped the

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10.1177/1057567720975631

insecurities that are generated by party political competition and the corresponding demand for protection in order to establish and maintain community support based on common political affiliations. They have used that support to nullify the efforts of law enforcement to suppress their illicit activities (Harriott, 2008).

The conflict profile of these gangs, and of the communities in which they are nested, has changed over the decades. Gang-delivered political violence was used to manipulate local electoral outcomes by forcing the most active opposing party supporters out of a contested electoral zone and preventing the less active supporters who remained in the zone from voting for their party. This activity triggered protracted wars with other gangs who sought to prevent or reverse this process by similar means. More recently, however, much of the crime and violence perpetrated by gangs has resulted from internal conflicts (e.g., status management, disputes over women and money). Internal conflict at times has led to gang fragmentation and new alliances that pull more parties into the conflict, escalating the homicide rate and increasing the sense of insecurity among the general population (Levy, 2012).

The most significant of these internal conflicts resulted from the killing of former Jungle 12 leader Neil Wright by members of his own gang. Jungle 12 was the most influential gang in Greater August Town. In an effort to increase the gang's access to illicit opportunities in Kingston, Wright had tried to extend Jungle 12's influence via a system of alliances with other gangs. In short, his ambition was to transform Jungle 12 from a neighborhood street gang to a citywide organized crime network. In pursuit of this goal, Wright recruited members from outside August Town, elevating them in the gang hierarchy above the locals. This led to status-related conflicts and resistance to Wright's leadership within the gang. His murder precipitated a split of Jungle 12 into three factions; two of them fled to other neighborhoods within August Town, resulting in the formation of new alliances and a new conflict geography that eclipsed the political geography of conflict. Wright's killing and the subsequent demise of Jungle 12 as the dominant gang in Greater August Town altered the balance of power and escalated intergang violence. The post-2005 phase of conflict was characterized by power symmetry, conflict intensification, and the spread of conflict throughout the entire geographic area of Greater August Town (K. Wilson, personal communication with Anthony Harriott, October 2014).

Although their origins are unclear, retaliatory killings and other violent incidents progressively intensified between 2005 and 2008. The violence was episodic; retaliations were most often motivated by suspicions related to disloyalties of gang members and the geographic connections between warring gangs—which are usually taken as a sign of alignments based on shared political affinities (Wilson, 2014). Both were taken as signs of imminent and highly threatening defections and realignments. As the violence

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10.1177/1057567720975631

escalated, new alliances were formed to enhance power and dominance, which in turn increased the number of gangs and gang members involved in the violence. This eventually attracted national attention and triggered community mobilization for a gang truce.

The truce-making process

The Greater August Town gang truce was preceded by frequent and intense violence. As noted above, the violence had escalated in November 2005 when Jungle 12 leader Neil Wright was killed. The defection of a Jungle 12 member to another faction (Goldsmith Villa) caused infighting within the gang and conflict between it and Goldsmith Villa. Just a few months later, Wright's brother and two others were injured during a turf battle (Martin-Wilkens, 2006[AQ11]). Thereafter, violence began to occur at regular intervals until January 2007, when the PMI hosted a peace march in the community. Two politicians urged the community to unite. A PMI leader declared that the peace march was being held to "demonstrate to the public that Jungle 12 members are back together and that they want peace" (Thompson, 2007, p. 1).

Although hopeful, some residents remained skeptical about the peace march, perceiving the action to be politically motivated. In the absence of trustworthy information, intergroup conflicts tended to be interpreted through a politically partisan lens; this created obstacles to isolating the gangs, building a consensus for peace, and unifying community mobilization. The politically based narratives weakened the community's leverage for peace and the exposure of the gangs to police action. As one resident said, "The election is coming up and they want[ed] the people to vote for the PNP is one of the main reasons why they have to walk today" (Thompson, 2007, p. 1). Those who shared such views stayed away from the peace march. Although that widely held view was not factual, it did serve to demoralize and demobilize one part of the community.

Following the peace march, the gang violence diminished. Then in November 2007, a turf war erupted between two gangs from the Greater August Town neighborhoods of "Vietnam" and "River." This time, as the police stated, the gang violence was less about politics and more about dominance and turf. Police were dispatched to perform directed patrols, but whenever they were not present, the shootings continued (Mcleod, 2007[AQ12]). In April 2008, the community witnessed local gangs engaging in a 5-hr-long street battle that left two killed and three others wounded. It ended only after the police deployed armored vehicles to the area. The next month, another round of gang violence resulted in five others being killed, including a 1-year-old child. The three members associated with the gang who committed the homicides were killed in retaliation (Virtue, 2008). The local community mobilized against the violence, increasingly cooperating with the police, providing more information about the gangs. The influence of the gangs had declined.

During the early period, characterized by low-intensity conflict, the less influential gangs at times manipulated the police as a tactic for suppressing the more influential gangs. This was largely done through strategic release of information. Prior to 2005, when Jungle 12 was dominant, its members' illicit activities were constantly reported to police by members of other gangs as a means of compelling a compromise or settlement of conflicts. In practice, this was done by "trading cases." Once a crime had been investigated by the police and suspects had been charged, an opportunity was created for the gangs and other parties to the conflict to settle the matter by agreeing to drop their cases (i.e., no longer cooperating with police investigators; K. Wilson, personal communication with Anthony Harriott, October 2014). This type of self-help served to end some of the retaliations, but it rested upon the somewhat limited ability to manipulate the police.

Later, in an attempt to quell escalating intergang violence, the police established buffer zones by inserting themselves between the warring gangs. This action resulted in unintended consequences. For example, when the police declared a buffer zone between August Town and Hermitage, Hermitage took advantage of the opportunity to attack Goldsmith Villa. Some residents of Goldsmith Villa accused the police of turning a blind eye and creating an opportunity for Hermitage to attack their community. Although little reliable information exists about why the police made the deployment the way that they did, it is more likely that the police inadequately assessed the situation (i.e., mis-assessed the pattern of alliances and the likely targets of attack). In the areas affected by the increasing violence, community members became angered and lost confidence in the police. The error resulted in some parties to the conflict receiving increased support from their communities and in greater gang–community cohesion. The gang in question was now seen as the more reliable defender of the community. After a brief period, the police identified this problem and began to disengage by no longer providing a buffer between gang-controlled areas, which in turn allowed still more conflict to occur between the gangs (K. Wilson, personal communication with Anthony Harriott, October 2014).

The establishment of the Greater August Town gang truce

The Greater August Town gang truce was led by the PMI. A number of other actors however helped to facilitate the truce; these included faculty at the UWI (Mona campus) and representatives from the police, faith-based groups, and the August Town Sports and Community Development Foundation. The gangs involved in the truce included those from the communities of August Town, Hermitage, Goldsmith Villa, Bedward Gardens, and African Gardens—all of which are within the Greater August Town area. Because of its formality and its perceived effectiveness, the truce, signed on June 24, 2008, was regarded by many as the first of its kind in Jamaica (Levy, 2009).

Truce negotiations began early in June 2008 and lasted for about 3 weeks. The gangs sought to leverage their violence-making capabilities and demanded payment for peace.

They asked the third-party negotiators for money, "work," and start-up funds for proposed micro-businesses (K. Wilson, personal communication with Anthony Harriott, October 2014). Those demands were rejected by the negotiators on the grounds that the third-party institutions would not buy a peace that was intended to save the lives of those who were making the demands. Moreover, if peace was to be purchased, then gang conflict could be used continuously to extract money and other benefits from negotiators. The third-party actors made some demands of their own. In some quarters of the community and society, the surrender of guns was viewed as a litmus test of the sincerity of the gangs. The negotiators suggested that the parties to the conflict symbolically hand over one gun each; that suggestion was immediately rejected by the gang leaders (H. Levy, personal communication with Anthony Harriott, 2014).[AQ13] The gangs held fast to their claim that their weapons were needed for their own protection because the police were ineffective in responding to violence in their communities (Jamaican Gleaner, 2010[AQ14]). The truce agreement did specify, however, that "all persons are allowed to move freely across all boundaries regardless of reputation or affiliation. No gun salute or any other shooting is to take place in the community for a period of at least five years" (Truce document, 2008). The truce agreement and its conditions were prescribed in a document that was finally signed by all of the major stakeholders, including the gangs (Katz & Amaya, 2015).

The Greater August Town gang truce was widely credited with decreasing violence in Greater August Town. A number of reports, manuscripts, and newspaper articles proclaimed the truce to be a success. Bakrania (2013, p. 10), for example, reported that "PMI has been credited with stopping gang wars in August Town…" A government report noted that "the peace treaty was a pivotal achievement in August Town that has significant potential for wider application. Crime levels dropped markedly in August Town after the signing of the peace agreement in June 2008" (McLean & Blake-Lobban, 2009c[AQ15], p. 78). To this day, August Town celebrates the signing of the truce with an annual celebration with food and music (Cunningham, 2011), and it still serves as an exemplar to other communities seeking to replicate its success (Virtue, 2008).

Method

This study relies on a pretest/posttest quasi-experimental group design. Our methodology examines the Greater August Town community, which is composed of three contiguous towns where the gang truce took place (the target area), and the balance of Jamaica, which is composed of 178 communities (comparison areas). As seen in Table 1, the average number of residents living in each of the three communities in the target area was not significantly different than that for the rest of Jamaica; on average, about 7,776 residents lived in each of the Greater August Town communities compared with 6,468 residents in the other communities. Likewise, communities of Greater August Town were

about as densely populated as other communities, and the age range of residents was similar, as well. However, Greater August Town had a significantly higher proportion of its residents living in poverty (19.6% vs. 15.8%) and consumed significantly fewer resources than other communities prior to the truce.

Table 1. Descriptive Characteristics of Greater August Town and Balance of Jamaica (2007–2011).[AQ16]

	Comparison Area	Greater August Town	All Areas
Population, mean (*SD*)	6,468 (7,204.82)	7,776.33 (3,537.31)	6,489.94 (7,156.21)
Population density, mean (*SD*)	2,647.19 (2,710.23)	2,960.33 (2,855.01)	2,652.38 (2,704.65)
Percent in poverty* (*SD*)	15.77 (10.36)	19.57 (1.06)	15.83 (10.29)
Consumption* (*SD*)	157,378.90 (107,130.20)	110,693.9 (2,053.36)	156,604.8 (106,402.1)
% Residents under 15 years old (*SD*)	23.69 (4.87)	24.94 (1.15)	23.71 (4.84)
% Residents 15–65 years old (*SD*)	68.40 (4.23)	69.01 (0.29)	68.41 (4.19)
Murder per month, mean (*SD*)	6.74 (19.28)	8.57 (14.09)	6.77 (19.20)
Total murders	10,068	180	10,248
N	178	3	181

*$p \leq .05$.

Two data sets were merged to measure the impact of the Greater August Town truce. First, data from the 2011 decennial census provided community-level measures of the social and economic characteristics of the 181 communities in Jamaica. While the census data were collected at the end of the truce, we feel the measures are still valid controls if we assume that the population at this level is stable. The community-level data used in the study included population, population density, gender, age, poverty, and consumption.[1] These data were obtained directly from the Statistical Institute of Jamaica. Second, police homicide data from 2007 to 2011 were used to construct the study's community-level measure of homicide. The homicide data were aggregated by month and appended to the community-level data. The final data set included 10,248 homicides over the 60-month study period. These data were obtained from the JCF.

The dependent variable examined in the study was constructed from the above-mentioned official police homicide data. We examined change by comparing the homicide data 18 months prior to the truce with the homicide data 42 months (3.5 years) following the truce. More specifically, we examined whether there was a change in the number of

homicides in the 30 days following the truce (Month 1) as well as whether the truce had an impact every 3 months thereafter (i.e., Months 2–5, 6–8, 9–11, 12–14, and 15–42), and whether any changes in homicide coincided with changes in homicide in the balance of observation areas. The frequency distribution of our dependent variable is presented in Table 2. It shows that prior to the truce, the target area, on average, experienced significantly more homicides per month (14.95) than did the comparison areas (9.20).

Table 2. Distribution of Homicides in the Target and Comparison Areas.[AQ17]

	Comparison Area	Target Area	Total
Pre-truce period*, mean (*SD*)	9.20 (24.69)	14.95 (19.66)	9.32 (24.61)
N	2,414.00	51.00	2,465.00
Month 1 of truce, mean (*SD*)	7.41 (17.85)	2.86 (4.96)	7.33 (17.72)
N	178.00	3.00	181.00
Months 2–5 of the truce, mean (*SD*)	6.47 (18.21)	9.05 (12.49)	6.52 (18.12)
N	712.00	12.00	724.00
Months 6–8 of the truce, mean (*SD*)	5.77 (16.90)	12.36 (10.74)	5.88 (16.83)
N	534.00	9.00	543.00
Months 9–11 of the truce, mean (*SD*)	7.18 (20.34)	3.33 (7.33)	7.11 (20.19)
N	534.00	9.00	543.00
Months 12–14 of the truce, mean (*SD*)	6.87 (15.19)	0.95 (2.86)	6.78 (15.09)
N	534.00	9.00	543.00
Months 15–42 of the truce, mean (*SD*)	5.64 (16.83)	5.89 (10.42)	5.64 (16.74)
N	5,162.00	87.00	5,249.00
Total, mean (*SD*)	6.74 (19.28)	8.57 (14.09)	6.77(19.20)
N	10,068.00	180.00	10,248.00

An illustration of the trends in homicide prior to and following the gang truce is shown in Figure 1. It shows that 30 days following the truce, homicides fell in the target and comparison areas, then increased and decreased several times, with a general downward slope in violence over time.

Figure 1. Monthly number of homicides pre-/post-truce in the target and comparison areas.



We also used a number of measures to control for community-level structure from the 2011 decennial census. These community-level data included the community's population, population density (per square kilometer), and community level of consumption. Additionally, the census data included measures of the percentage of the population that was female, under 15 years old, 15 and 65 years old, and 65 years old and older as well as a measure of the percentage of the population living in poverty. Principal component analysis was used to reduce some of these data into a summary measure. Table 3 shows the results of the component loadings. One component was extracted that we designated as socioeconomic status (high values indicate poverty), which exhibited high loadings for percent living in poverty, percent under 15 years old, percent 15–65 years old, and consumption. Excluded from the principal component analysis were population and population density. Population was used as our exposure variable, and population density was logged to address skewness in these data.

Table 3. Factor Loadings From Principal Component Analysis.

	Loading
Poverty	.78
Consumption	−.76
% Under 15 years old	.92
% Between 15 and 65 years old	−.80

Analytic Strategy

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In order to test whether the truce had an impact on homicides in the target area and whether displacement had occurred in the balance of the country, several analytic techniques were employed. Most of the methods employed the homicide rate as the dependent variable to provide the maximum statistical power to detect an effect. The final method employed a "random effect" generalized model to compensate for the nonnormality of our outcomes. The generalized link function we employed is a negative binomial link, which is similar to a Poisson count model except that it compensates for overdispersion. We also allowed the intercept for town to randomly vary.

First, we employed time series models whereby the homicide rate for the target area was modeled as a function of time, with truce period indicators included to measure the effect of the truce net of the temporal trends. These models were estimated with a first-order autocorrelated (AR1) technique with a 1-month lag autocorrelated error.

Next, we examined the homicide rate for each town using a panel time series model. In this model, the temporal trend for each town was examined with indicators for target areas and truce periods included.

Finally, because the dependent variable coded is not normally distributed across months, we used a negative binomial time series model to estimate the number of homicides, with the population covariate serving as an exposure variable.

Findings

The first set of results examines only the target area. The results for two models are presented in Table 4. In Model 1, without a time trend effect, we observed declines in the murder rates for each set of months after the truce and a significant decrease in the murder rate 15 months after the truce (−8.888, $p < .01$). However, when we control for the general trend (Model 2 in Table 4), the effect is much smaller and no longer significant. This indicates that any temporal effects in Model 1 are simply spurious detections of the general trend.

Table 4. Results of AR1 Models Predicting Murder Rate.

	Model 1	Model 2
Intercept	15.384 (1.904)***	148.027 (119.732)
Linear trend		−0.2318963 (0.209)
1 Month	−11.118 (44.636)	−9.195 (54.621)
2 Months	−5.166 (4.498)	−2.354 (4.924)
6 Months	−2.861 (6.335)	0.2995697 (6.577)
9 Months	−13.248 (9.190)	−8.844 (9.403)

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	Model 1	Model 2
12 Months	−15.077 (18.204)	−9.707 (22.280)
15 Months	−8.888 (2.969)**	−0.3519687 (7.695)
AR1 parameter	0.1720758 (0.124)	0.1270618 (0.125)
Log-likelihood	−208.997	−208.203

Note. Standard errors in parentheses; AR1 = first-order autocorrelation.
**$p < .01$. ***$p < .001$.

We next estimated the possible displacement effects of the truce. Table 5 presents the results of these models. The main effects for the truce periods measured the effect of the truce in the target areas by months since the truce, and the moderators of the truce period in the comparison areas measured the displacement effects. Like the AR1 model, none of the effects for months since the truce were significant. However, also like the AR1 model, the time trend was significant, indicating that the rate decreased over time on average. Examination of the truce and comparison interaction effects, we also do not find any displacement effects. Note that these models also controlled for the sociodemographic characteristics of each community.

Table 5. Results of Panel (Town) Time Series Model With Control of Temporal Trends Predicting Murder Rate.

	Coefficient (*SE*)
Main effects	
1 Month	−12.152 (10.957)
2 Months	−5.034 (7.123)
6 Months	0.656 (7.867)
9 Months	−10.143 (7.882)
12 Months	−12.625 (7.872)
15 Months	−4.269 (4.284)
Comparison	−4.757 (3.277)
Comparison ×	
1 Month	10.569 (11.047)
2 Months	3.499 (7.175)
6 Months	−1.704 (7.919)
9 Months	10.427 (7.926)
12 Months	13.185 (7.903)

	Coefficient (*SE*)
15 Months	5.392 (4.129)
Linear trend	−0.128 (0.035)***
SES	1.245 (0.243)***
ln(pop.density)	1.220 (0.171)***
Intercept	6.310 (3.519)

Note. SES = socioeconomic status.
***$p < .001$.

Finally, we used a random effects negative binomial regression that predicted the homicide rate, with the population as an exposure variable, and controlled for the sociodemographic characteristics of each community. The results are presented in Table 6. The analysis showed that time had a negative effect, indicating that homicides were decreasing on average over the study period. The main effects of the truce (truce = 1, 2,…) represented the effects of the truce in the targeted area and did not show a significant effect for any period following the gang truce. However, we did find that the homicide rate significantly increased in the comparison areas in Months 12 through 14 following the truce. In particular, we found a 29% increase in the homicide rate in the comparison communities for that period compared to pre-truce periods (exp (−1.797 + 2.048) = 1.285, $p = .04$). Since this effect is only significant at the .05 level, however, and given the number of analyses used to examine the data, it is possible that we found this effect by chance alone.

Table 6. Random Effects Negative Binomial Predicting Murders (With Population offset).

	Coefficient (*SE*)
1 Month	
Lag	0.005 (0.001)***
Linear trend	−0.020 (0.003)***
Main effects	
1 Month	−0.814 (1.016)
2 Months	−0.101 (0.401)
6 Months	0.075 (0.408)
9 Months	−0.973 (0.728)
12 Months	−1.797 (1.015)
15 Months	−0.051 (0.252)
Comparison	−0.280 (0.362)

	Coefficient (*SE*)
Comparison ×	
1 Month	1.035 (1.021)
2 Months	−0.068 (0.406)
6 Months	−0.297 (0.415)
9 Months	1.229 (0.731)
12 Months	2.048 (1.016)*
15 Months	0.418 (0.235)
Calendar month	
1	0.170 (0.107)
2	−0.021 (0.103)
3	0.071 (0.102)
4	0.012 (0.103)
5	0.398 (0.092)***
7	0.235 (0.097)*
8	0.073 (0.103)
9	0.105 (0.102)
10	0.166 (0.102)
11	0.396 (0.099)***
12	0.194 (0.103)
SES	−0.091 (0.051)
ln(pop.density)	0.175 (0.039)***
Intercept	−9.016 (0.484)***

Note. SES = socioeconomic status.

Discussion

From 2000 to 2009, traditional law enforcement responses to gang violence were repeatedly implemented, but until 2010, these responses had little effect. Some policymakers in Jamaica and elsewhere in the Caribbean and Central America have recently been experimenting with gang truces. In Jamaica, at least eight gang truces have been negotiated since 2001 (Levy, 2009). The Greater August Town gang truce was reported to be one of the more successful, and it has served as a model for other communities to use (Levy, 2009). Our purpose was to identify the actors involved in the

negotiations of that truce, the negotiation goals, and the implementation methods used and then to examine empirically the impact of that truce on homicide rates in the targeted community.

At first glance, our impact findings appeared to show that the gang truce was an effective mechanism for reducing violence. Bivariate analyses showed a significant decline in homicides after the truce was implemented. Upon further examination of the data, however, comparing change in the target and comparison areas and accounting for temporal trends, we found that the decline in homicide was part of a larger nationwide decline in violence and that the gang truce was not responsible for the decline. The only significant effect that we uncovered was the possibility that homicides were displaced outside the target area for a brief period of time but then returned to normal.

A number of explanations might be offered for the strategy's lack of effectiveness.[AQ18] It might be that the Jamaican gang leaders, at least those in Greater August Town, did not have the organizational capacity to change gang member behavior. Much prior research suggests that in general gangs have limited organizational structure and little formal leadership. This might suggest that gangs do not possess the necessary capacity to regulate their members' violence. That said, gangs in Jamaica, including some of those in Greater August Town, have been found to be fairly organizationally sophisticated and to possess strong leadership.

In fact, in a small number of Jamaican communities, gangs have been found to be highly organized, with individual gang leaders being referred to as dons and community leaders. The gang leader in such a community is often found to have substantial control over members and residents, as these communities often turn to the don rather than the police for justice. The don will hold court and punish those who commit a crime. Punishment can include beatings and execution (Mogensen, 2004b[AQ19]). Although this level of organizational structure and sophistication is found only in a small number of Jamaican communities, generally the gangs in Jamaica are believed to have some organizational capacity or at least enough to reduce violence in communities.

Our findings, however, indicated that prior to 2005 and the death of Neil Wright, perhaps only Jungle 12 could approximate that capacity to discipline members and enforce a truce. After the gang's fragmentation in 2005, Jungle 12 lost much of its organizational capability, and enforcement of the truce was therefore difficult. The truce negotiators sought to address the enforcement issue by proposing a peace council that would involve all parties (K. Wilson, personal communication with Anthony Harriott, October 2014). The proposal was approved by all key stakeholders; still, some gang leaders demanded cash payments as a condition for attending council meetings. Peace was consistently seen by them as a bargaining tool rather than as an honest attempt to

establish and maintain peace. In the end, members of only two gangs were attending the meetings,[2] and the council was dissolved.

In an effort to replicate the council function, UWI sponsored one of the most respected negotiators, a community activist, to become a one-person monitoring and intervention specialist, or a "violence interrupter." His job was to ensure that truce violations did not lead to a return of the gang wars—and there were many violations of the truce. For example, there were instances of gang members crossing boundaries and entering the turf of another gang armed, although not initiating conflict, behavior that was interpreted by the opposing gangs as preparation for the next round of "war" or as laying a foundation for a surprise attack that would exploit the truce for this purpose. In the absence of the council, these matters were reported to a violence interrupter, who tried to resolve the problems in consultation with the various gang leaders (K. Wilson, personal communication with Anthony Harriott, October 2014). Often the gang leaders were unresponsive or incapable, and therefore, the threatening practices and violence continued. Ultimately, there were no rules or bodies or persons who could regulate the violence, and there were never any reference points for compliance. The formal truce agreement was an attempt to negotiate and impose such rules via collective pressure that would include third parties, but it was unsuccessful in doing so. The potential for reengineering norms related to conflict thus was not realized.

Another explanation for the failure of the gang truce might be that it was more a vehicle for rhetoric rather than for reality. The gang leaders insisted that they would sign the truce agreement only if it were ratified in public with the presence of the media (Levy, 2009). The leaders might have viewed the process in and of itself as a means of increasing their reputation and influence within the community and in policymaking circles (and to reduce mutual distrust). In signing the truce, gang leaders publicly pledged to reduce their involvement in violence, thereby calming local residents' fears. They also made public efforts to increase resources for their communities, perhaps in an attempt to portray themselves as "providers" to the community. In fact, the truce did provide gang leaders with an opportunity to be seen in public, collaborating with important community stakeholders. The imagery of the public signing was of the government (via the PMI) and others approaching the gang to ask them to use their means of informal social control in the community to reduce violence—to accomplish something that the government could not do on its own. As a consequence, the process may have been perceived by gang leaders as a victory because it enhanced the gangs' reputation with both the government and the community.

Alternatively, from the start, the gangs might not have been fully invested in the gang truce. One of the major criticisms of the Greater August Town gang truce was that gangs

were not required to give up their firearms, although some believed that this was an unrealistic request:

> ...their demand, and the demand of many, that all guns be turned in immediately was quite unrealistic, given the decades of ingrained gun culture and the continued inability of the security forces to guarantee protection for any corner against armed rivals. It was obvious to most observers that that kind of situation could not be ended overnight and that this was a reasonable first step in the process. (Levy, 2009, p. 63)

The gangs feared that if they were to disarm themselves, they would be vulnerable to other gangs and unable to protect themselves, a concern that appears not to have been addressed by mediators. Indeed, at times some elements within the community felt somewhat dependent on the gangs to maintain security. If the gangs would have been disarmed and there were no near-term alternative prospects for any form of social control, both the gang and the community might have faced additional violence, as has been observed in the past. In the end, the gang truce only called for a reduction in gang violence and did not provide any solutions to address the larger problems between the gangs, nor did it provide the gangs with any tangible benefits for abiding by the truce.

Conclusion

Over the last several years, there have been a number of naturally occurring quasi-experiments involving gang truces in a variety of nations, in various regions of the world. Findings from some prior research examining gang truces suggest that their potential for long-term harm *might* outweigh the potential for short-term benefits. As noted above, in El Salvador, the gang truce was associated with a 2-year decline in homicides but was followed by a record-shattering number of homicides (Katz et al., 2016). In Los Angeles (Ordog et al., 1995) and Trinidad and Tobago (Maguire et al., 2013), there was evidence that violence decreased for at least 90 days but then increased substantially beyond those rates observed prior to the gang truce. Conversely, in Jamaica, we found that the gang truce had no negative or positive impact on violence—in the short or long term. We speculate that there might have been multiple reasons that the gang truce failed, none of which were necessarily mutually exclusive, but included: (1) gang leaders might not have had the capacity to regulate violence, (2) there were no incentives to abide by the truce (e.g., third parties did not have the means to hold gangs accountable, no tangible benefits to the gang or community), and (3) some of the gangs might have been more interested in participating in the rhetoric surrounding the gang truce for the purpose of enhancing their reputation, rather than actually implementing the truce, which might have weakened their gang.

It is important to note that a number of scholars have observed that gang truces are likely to result in a boomerang effect, with gang violence increasing over the long run because of enhanced cohesion within the gang (M. Klein, 1995). Maguire (2013) notes that when government officials negotiate a truce with gangs, they might "inadvertently be

acknowledging gangs as legitimate social entities" (p. 11). This in itself might increase cohesion among gangs, which has been found to be associated with increased levels of criminality (Decker et al., 2008[AQ20]; M. Klein, 1971; Maguire, 2013). Further research is needed to examine how gang truces might impact group cohesion and, if it does, whether the cohesion created could be effectively directed toward more productive nonviolent endeavors. Gang truces convey the well-intentioned image that violence has been addressed and policymakers are doing something about the problem, but unless the truce is implemented in a manner and under conditions where immediately achievable results can be promised, delivered, and measured, there remains a significant chance that the truce will fail or, worse yet, backfire. This will better position policymakers to understand the relative risks associated with these types of interventions.

Given the risks associated with a gang truce, communities with high levels, or at least modest levels, of formal social control should rely on other more promising evidence-based gang control strategies such as "pulling levers," problem-oriented policing, and extracting and applying the principles and methods of other strategies and programs, which have shown promise in a wide enough range of settings (such as the Gang Resistance Education and Training, also known as GREAT program). Only when the state has limited or greatly reduced capacity for social control, should a truce be considered, and during this period of peacemaking, an important objective should be to shift the centers of social power and improve the effectiveness and legitimacy of law enforcement such that an outcome of the process is the increased capacity for social control.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The authors disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: The majority of the funding for the research was obtained through the Arizona State University Foundation. No funding source had a role in study design; the collection, analysis, and interpretation of data; the writing of the manuscript; or the decision to submit this article for publication.[GQ3]

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Notes

1. Consumption is an alternative measure of poverty in Jamaica, which measures the consumption of food and nonfood items. While poverty measures traditionally only focus on personal income, consumption measures account for the use of savings

accounts, durable goods, and resources obtained through public social services (e.g., food stamps and housing subsidies) to reduce the effects of poverty.

2. Interestingly, the Jungle 12 factions did not attend any of the peace council meetings.

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Author Biographies

[AQ1]

GENERAL QUERIES

[GQ1]	Please note that we cannot add/amend ORCID iDs for any article at the proof stage. Following ORCID's guidelines, the publisher can include only ORCID iDs that the authors have specifically validated for each manuscript prior to official acceptance for publication.	Accepted
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AUTHOR QUERIES

[AQ2]	Please approve the edits made to the affiliation 1.	Accepted
[AQ3]	Please insert complete reference details for “Spergel et al., 1995” or delete the citation.	Answered within text
[AQ4]	Note that the year “2014” has been changed to “2015” for reference “Fox et al., 2015” as per the reference list. If this is inaccurate, please update the citation.	Accepted
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[AQ6]	Please insert complete reference details for “Fahah, 2012” or delete the citation.	Needs further review, add comment **Comment:** Farah, D. (2012). Central American gangs: Changing nature and new partners. Journal of international affairs, 53-67.
[AQ7]	Please insert complete reference details for “Lemard &	Needs further review, add comment

	Hemenway, 2006" or delete the citation.	**Comment:** Lemard, G., & Hemenway, D. (2006). Violence in Jamaica: an analysis of homicides 1998–2002. Injury Prevention, 12(1), 15-18.
[AQ8]	Please suggest whether the citation "Harriott, 2008" refers to "Harriott, 2008a" or "Harriott, 2008b"? Please confirm which reference is being cited here and in the subsequent occurrences.	Answered within text
[AQ9]	Note that the year "2004" has been changed to "2005" for reference "Sinclair, 2005" as per the reference list. If this is inaccurate, please update the citation.	Accepted
[AQ10]	Per style, we have retained the quotes in the first instance and removed them in subsequent instances for "wars." Please approve.	Accepted
[AQ11]	Please insert complete reference details for "Martin-Wilkens, 2006" or delete the citation.	Needs further review, add comment **Comment:** Martin-Wilins, Arlene. 2006. August Town Hot Spots Erupts in Renewed Turf Fight. Jamaica Observer, January 22nd .
[AQ12]	Please insert complete reference details for "Mcleod, 2007" or delete the citation.	Needs further review, add comment **Comment:** I was unable to find the reference can you please change this to the personal communication with Harriott. It would be K. Wilson, personal communication with Anthony Harriott, October 2014.

[AQ13]	Please provide the date and month details of the personal communications.	Needs further review, add comment **Comment:** unknown day and month
[AQ14]	Note that the year “2014” has been changed to “2010” for reference “Jamaican Gleaner, 2010” as per the reference list. If this is inaccurate, please update the citation.	Accepted
[AQ15]	Please insert complete reference details for “McLean & Blake-Lobban, 2009” or delete the citation.	Needs further review, add comment **Comment:** McLean, Andrew and Sherrone Blake Lobban. 2009. ‘Assessment of Community Security and Transformation Programmes in Jamaica.’ Kingston: Government of Jamaica.
[AQ16]	Please insert the first column header for Tables 1–6.	Needs further review, add comment **Comment:** Community Characteristic
[AQ17]	Please check and approve the layout of Tables 2, 4, 5,and 6.	Needs further review, add comment **Comment:** can you change the lettering so that there are not spaces in the words. For example the work "Area" is spaced funny. Also please remove the horizontal line at the 60 mark. There should only be one line and that is the one right above the 2008m7. the res tof the "box" should be removed.
[AQ18]	Please approve the edit made to the sentence “A number of explanations…”.	Accepted

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[AQ19]	Is this “Mogensen, 2004a” or “Mogensen, 2004b”? Please confirm which reference is being cited in the sentence “Punishment can include beatings…”.	Answered within text
[AQ20]	Please insert complete reference details for “Decker et al., 2008” or delete the citation.	Needs further review, add comment **Comment:** Decker, S. H., Katz, C. M., & Webb, V. J. (2008). Understanding the black box of gang organization: Implications for involvement in violent crime, drug sales, and violent victimization. Crime & delinquency, 54(1), 153-172.
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[AQ29]	Please insert URL for reference “Sinclair, G. (2005).”.	Needs further review, add comment **Comment:** I could not located the web site, but the article was printed on March 18th, 2005
[AQ30]	Please insert URL for reference “Truce document. (2008, June 24).”.	Needs further review, add comment **Comment:** It was emailed to me. There was no website it was downloaded from.

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[AQ32]	Please insert URL for reference "Virtue, E. (2008, June 15).".	Needs further review, add comment **Comment:** http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/August-Town-gunmen-agree-to-peace-pact
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[AQ1]	Please provide a 2- to 3-sentence bio for each author.	Needs further review, add comment **Comment:** I put our bios in the comment by GQ4

COMMENTS

[Comment 1]	Charles Katz is the Watts Family Director of the Center for Violence Prevention and Community Safety and is a Professor in the School of Criminology and Criminal Justice at Arizona State University. His work focuses on police transformation and strategic responses to crime. He has worked under contract with the Ministry of National Security of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago to develop a comprehensive strategic plan to reform the Trinidad and Tobago Police Services. Since then he has completed a project funded by the UNDP to assess citizen insecurity throughout the Caribbean; and worked for the Eastern Caribbean's Regional Security System to diagnose the

gang problem in nine Caribbean nations and develop a regional approach to responding to gangs. He has also completed several research projects for the US Department of Homeland Security and USAID in El Salvador and Honduras on issues involving the police and an evaluation of a violence prevention and intervention program. He is currently working on the Community, Family and Youth Resilience project and CariSECURE, both sponsored by USAID. Anthony Harriott (PhD) is a Professor of Political Sociology, and Director of the Institute of Criminal Justice and Security at the University of the West Indies. He is the author/ co-author of several books, articles and technical reports - primarily on the issues of violence, organised crime and policing in Caribbean societies. The books include: Police and Crime Control in Jamaica: Problems of Reforming Ex-colonial Constabularies (2000), Organized Crime and Politics in Jamaica: Breaking the Nexus (2008) and Gangs in the Caribbean – The Response of Sate and Society -with Charles Katz (published in 2014). He serves on a number of boards and committees that are engaged with matters of public safety and justice including the CARICOM Task Force on Crime and Security, and the Police Oversight Authority of Jamaica. He was also a member of the recently concluded commission of inquiry into the Christopher Coke extradition matter in which the armed conflict between Coke's organized crime network and the security forces of the Jamaican state resulted in the death of 69 persons. E. C. Hedberg is a senior researcher at NORC at the University of Chicago where he works on a number of evaluation studies in the fields of education, criminology, and health. He also publishes studies about evaluation methodology, including parameters for designing adequately powered studies with complex sample structures.

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10.1177/1057567720975631